On his discharge from the hospital, the respondent was sent to JAK Rifles, Jabalpur. Variava, came to the hospitals Dr. Anija told him that it was a case of diabetic coma. He had heard arguments on the question whether any charges should be framed and had fixed September 30,1954, for orders in this respect. the Magistrate had framed no charges upto September 30, 1954. The respondent has pleaded that subsequent to his discharge from the hospital he was detained for duties at Kargil.
Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh(3). Variava thereupon reprimanded her by saying " How can you diagnose a case of diabetic coma without ascertaining acetone in the urine ? Anija replied that she did so because there was sugar present in the urine. On January 26, 1942, the Official Receiver filed I. The Review Medical Board, after examining him, placed him in category BEE permanent for the first disability and category CEE temporary for the second disability as mentioned therein.
While conceding that the application under s. He then should have called upon them to produce defence evidence, if any, under s. He, thereafter, underwent initial military training at JAK Rifles Centre, Jabalpur whereafter he was posted at No. It was soon thereafter that he was invalided from service on being adjudged unsuitable, by the invaliding Medical Board which assessed his disability percentage as 20% qua the first disability; and 20% for the second disability; summing upto 40% for both the diseases.
The rule is-and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of (1) (1955) I All E. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge. Variava then himself examined the patient and thereafter asked Dr.
However, some of the appeals arise against the earlier Division Bench judgment dated 25-11- 2008 whereby the High Court had upheld the same Notifications and rejected the challenge to the acquisition of land. Though he applied for sheltered appointment, the same was not entertained. Variava then asked her whether she had examined the urine for acetone to which she replied that she had not. 208 and then proceeded further under Ch.
the HonorarY Visiting Physician, Dr. The respondent had joined the Army service under the Union of India on 06. He availed leave as was granted thereafter, to join later at his transit Camp at Chandigarh. 1999 being awarded medical category of AYE and according to him after undergoing rigorous medical examinations as prescribed. The Medical Board that was set up for his examination lowered his category from AYE to CEE temporary w. One day he fell unconscious in the course of cross country practice in the unit premises and had to be shifted to Military Hospital, Amritsar where he was treated for his ailment.
Anija why she thought it to be a case of diabetic coma, to which Dr. Some appeals are filed by the NOIDA authority where the Division Bench had quashed the notification. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was maintainable if the decree was a nullity, the learned Counsel for the respondent contends that notwithstanding the non-compliance of the provisions of s. 56 of the Act, the High Court had jurisdiction to record the compromise lawfully effected by the Court of Wards, and therefore, the decree was not a nullity and could not be ignored.
628 On September 27, 1937, a settlement was entered into between the assignee-decree-holder and the judgment debtors and the said 'execution petition was closed. The foundational facts as offered by the rival pleadings would provide the back-drop of the lingering debate. His claim for disability pension was also rejected on the ground that the disabilities detected in him were neither attributable to the Army service nor could get aggravated therefrom. The Board thus recommended that he be invalided out of Army service which, in fact, was given effect to on 01.
As admitted by him, while on duty, he again fell to the same illness and had to be hospitalized. On August 2, 1940, the assignee-decree-holder filed another execution petition, E. This question of the proper approach of the Court of Appeal to decisions on questions of fact arrived at by the Trial Court was considered by this Court in Sarju Pershad v. On January 7, 1939, Venkatachalam Chettiar was ,,adjudicated insolvent on the ground that the assignment of the said decree by him in favour of his mother, Meenakshi Achi, was an act of insolvency, whereupon his properties vested in the first respondent, the Official Receiver, Ramanathapuram at Madurai.
He unsuccessfully appealed against this decision before the higher authorities. " Thereafter under the directions of Dr. Section 74, provides for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for or a sum is named and lays down that when a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.
5 JAK Rifles at Amritsar on 5. , while delivering the judgment of the Court observed:- " In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. When, therefore, he decided on September 30,1954, that the case ought to be committed to the Court of Session, the proper course for him was to refrain from framing any charges and intimate to the accused that he intended to commit them for trial.
Most of these appeals are filed against the Full Bench. Contending that the decision to board him out of service and the denial of disability pension otherwise payable to him under the relevant rules, was illegal and arbitrary, the respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu for its remedial intervention. 243 of 1940, and it was struck off on September 30, 1940.